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Chief-Justice Jay, three years after the adoption of th2 Con-
stitution; laid down the proposition "that by the Constitution of
the United States, the Government thereof is divided into three
distinct and independent branches, and that it is the duty of
each to abstain from and to oppose encroachments on either."'
These branches are the legislative, executive and judicial.
The distinction has always been treated in theory as funda-
mental, and for a long time its preservation was treated in actual
practice also as an object of great solicitude. The early amend-
ments to the Constitution gave additional guarantees that the
judicial sphere should not be invaded by the legislature or by
the executive. The judiciary, on the other hand, maintained
their right to exemption from non-judicial work. The Chief-
Justice, in the case just quoted, laid down the further proposi-
tion: "That neither the legislative nor the executive branches
can constitutionally assign to the judicial any duties but such as
are properly judicial and to be performed in a judicial manner."
Upon the same principle the executive departments claimed, and
the judiciary conceded that the executive discretion should not
be guided nor interfered with in any way by judicial process.
Even when the duties of the executive were of the simplest and
clearest character, the right of the judiciary to compel their per-
formance was stoutly resisted. The controversy, which was com-
menced by Jefferson and Marshall at the beginning of the cen-
tury, was not settled until the time of Van Buren.' No student
of our form of government can afford not to read the vigorous
exposition of this fundamental distinction by Postmaster-General
Kendall and Attorney-General Butler in the lower court in Ken-
dall's case, its more qualified statement by the Attorney-General
in the same case at the bar of the Supreme Court, or the opin-
ions of the Supreme Court Justices in this case and in that of
Secretary Paulding which immediately followed, and which have
yesulted in confining the remedy of mandamus, in the Federal
'Hayburn's Case, 2. Dall. 41o, note.
2 Marbury v. Madison, i Cr. 137; United States v. Kendall, 5 Cr. C.C. 163;
Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524; Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. 497.
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courts, within limits narrower, probably, than those recognized
in any other system of jurisprudence of English origin.
In order to secure the entire independence of the judiciary,
its members were given practically a life tenure. They were
not even to be retired compulsorily for old age. They were to
be removed from office only by a two-thirds vote of the United
States Senators, sitting as a Court of Impeachment. It was in-
tended thus to ensure fearlessness in the performance of judicial
duties, by providing that the tenure of judicial office should be
made secure before its incumbent should be called upon to ren-
der any decision.
It may be interesting to consider how thoroughly this consti-
tutional theory has proved complete. It will be found that all
Federal Judges, except the justices of the Supreme Court of the
United States, are practically removable; that among one class
of them removals are of continual occurrence; and that it is even
not impossible for a man to occupy the highest judicial position
in the nation, and then to lose it by reason of an unpopular de-
cision. It will be found that all judges may be charged with
some duties strictly executive in nature, while some judges may
be charged with executive duties to an indefinite extent. It
will be found that a large department of work strictly judicial in
its nature may be confided either to the judicial or to the execu-
tive branch, at the will of Congress; which has gone even so far
in practice as to grant a right of appeal from the judiciary to the
executive or vice versd.
Mr. Justice Curtis has defined judicial acts, in an "enlarged"
sense, as "all those administrative duties the performance of
which involves an inquiry into the existence of facts and the appli-
cation to them of rules of law."' He instances among such acts
that of the President in calling out the militia; but this gives
the term an enlarged definition indeed, for when the President,
having been asked to call out the militia, has ascertained the
facts and satisfied himself about his legal powers, there still re-
mains a question of expediency to be determined, and this ele-
ment of expediency makes the case one calling rather for execu-
tive than for judicial discretion, although a discretion sometimes
exercised by courts, as in the care of trust property or of property
attached. The definition would become a stricter one by exclud-
ing the element of expediency and postulating "all the elements
of a civil case-a complainant, a defendant, and a judge-actor,
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., IS How. 272, 280.
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reus etilidex."" It is not necessary to the essence of a judicial
act that it be performed by a person bearing a judicial title.
Thus the Constitution expressly provides for a Court of Impeach-
ment composed of United States Senators, and provides, also,
that each House of Congress shall be "the judge of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of its own members."
Passing by these exceptional instances and those afforded by
military and naval tribunals, judicial discretion, as above
defined, in our Federal Government, is exercised by at least
three classes of officers; first, judges appointed under the judi-
ciary article of the Constitution; second, judges appointed under
the territorial provision of the Constitution; and, third, quasi-
judicial officers deputed by Congress for the decision of contro-
versies to which the United States is a party. These classes will
now be considered separately.
I. Judges ap pointed under the judiciary arti-le.-In theory,
as we have said, these officers are irremovable except upon con-
viction in a Court of Impeachment. They hold by a tenure
whose dignity is now very rare. They are commonly spoken of
as holding for life.
Nevertheless, in every court save one, if a sufficient number of
the judges become obnoxious to the other branches of the Gov-
ernment, they can be got rid of. The Constitution provides that
the judicial power "shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in
such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish." As the Constitution has been practically
construed, Congress may abolish an inferior court as well as estab-
lish it. This has actually been done in two noted instances.
The first occurred in 1802. In the last weeks of the Federalist
administration, a bench of United States Circuit Judges had been
established by law, and had been filled by Federalist appoint-
ments. The political effect of this, so far as we may judge from
the Congressional debates, had been overlooked in the excite-
ment of the pending contest for the Presidency between Jefferson
and Burr. The immense power which the Federal judges could
exercise is construing the constitution and laws was, however,
coming into general recognition, and the Republican party, on
assuming the control of the legislative and executive branches of
the Government, saw what a weapon had been placed, perhaps
for a generation to come, in the hands of the opposition. The
new judges could not be removed. The new court, therefore, was
'Fong Yue Ting v'. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 729.
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abolished, after a great constitutional debate. The judges united
in a memorial protesting against the proceeding; but they
were even denied a resort to quo warranto.' In x863 a similar
method was adopted for the purpose of getting rid of the judges
of the United States Circuit Court for the District of Columbia.
Again the constitutional question was raised in Congress. Some
claim was made that this was only a territorial court, and, there-
fore, not protected by the judiciary article of the Constitution;
but Senator Ira Harris of New York, who was in charge of the
measure, and had himself long held high judicial office, put it
squarely on the ground that Congress had the right to abolish
any inferior court. The bar of the District protested; but the
court was abolished, and the present Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia, composed of new judges, took its place.
The Supreme Court of the United States was established by
the Constitution itself, and therefore cannot be abolished. Its
membership can be diminished only by voluntary retirement, by
impeachment, or by death; thus giving Congress the power, as
in x866, to make the diminution permanent. Congress, however,
may increase the membership, as was done in 1807, 1837 and
x869. In this respect it is similar to the highest British tribu-
nal, the House of Lords. If popular feeling against its mem-
bers or their decisions at any particular time become sufficiently
strong, it can be "packed" by increasing its numbers sufficiently
to control its vote. The House of Lords, although some-
times threatened, has not been actually "packed " for
nearly two centuries; and the Supreme Court has never even
been openly threatened, so far as I am aware, although it has
been often charged that President Grant in effect "packed" the
court in 1870 in order to obtain the overruling of one of its de-
cisions, and although such an intent during the present year has
been claimed to be hidden in the wording of the platform of one
of the great political parties. The writer has elsewhere argued
that the chief bulwark against this danger has been the general
practice of the court in adhering to its decisions upon political
questions notwithstanding changes of membership.' It is possi-
ble, however, that a man may sit for a while upon the Supreme
Court as upon any inferior court, and yet be without the consti-
a Annals of Congress, January 27 and February 3, 1803, PP. 30-32, 51-78,
427-441.
' Political Dangers of the Income Tax Decision. -The Forum," July, x895,
p. 529.
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tutional guaranty of independence. Whatever offices become
vacant during a recess of the Senate, the President has power to
fill "by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of
their next session." Under this provision John Rutledge of
South Carolina was appointed Chief-Justice of the United States
Supreme Court by President Washington during a recess of the
Senate, and actually presided at the August term, 1795. The
Senate subsequently refused to confirm his nomination, some say
on the ground of insanity, some say for political reasons. The
precedent has been attacked as dangerous and as violating the
spirit of the Constitution; but it has not infrequently been follow-
ed, at least in the case of inferior courts.
Space does not permit a discussion here of the limits within
which the courts may interfere with Federal executive officers
by mandamuzs, by injunction or otherwise. Curious questions
have arisen as to how far Congress may go in imposing quasi-
executive duties upon the judges. The first and second Con-
gresses attempted to impose upon the Circuit Courts the duty of
examining into applications for invalid pensions and reporting
their conclusions thereon to the Secretary of War, to whom
appellate jurisdiction was given. The judges held unanimously
that such business was not judicial, and that the statutes were
nullities." Congress subsequently provided that the United
States District Judge for Florida should adjudicate upon certain
claims of the United States in that District, the adjudication,
however, to be subject to review by the Secretary of the Treas-
ury. The Supreme Court unanimously held that this was not
judicial business, being "entirely alien to the legitimate func-
tions of a judge or court of justice;" and that if the judge could
properly act under the statute at all, he "could not act in a judi-
cial character ds a court nor as a commissioner." Grave doubt
was expressed as to the constitutionality of the law, but this
question was not presented and therefore not decided.'
Similar laws are now upon the statute book, and are admin-
istered by the judges without question. Thus it is common for
a district judge to take evidence upon the question of good faith
after the imposition of a penalty or forfeiture for violation of the
tariff laws; his findings of fact being transmitted to the Secre-
tary of the Treasury, who is not, however, bound thereby.9 So,
7 Hayburn's Case, sufira, United States v. Ya!e Todd, 13 How. 52, note.
8 United States v. Ferrcira, 13 How. 4o, 5i.
A nti-Moiety Act of lune 22, 1874, 9 17, zS.
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also, the district judges often report the facts upon applications
of district attorneys for compensation even for servi'ees rendered
out of court.'" Under a similar statute, however, whereby the
judge is called upon to certify the value of an informer's ser-
vices, subject to review by the Secretary of the Treasury, Judge
Maxey of the Western District of Texas has recently held that
the power attempted to be conferred is not judicial, and that the
judges accordingly are without jurisdiction in the premises."
No attempt appears to have been made to obtain a review of
this decision.
The Constitution itself recognizes, however, that the courts
may properly perform duties of an executive nature, and
accordingly provides expressly that Congress may vest in them
"the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper."
The United States Commissioners and the Clerks of Court, who
belong to the executive branch of the government, are appointed
under this provision, and District Attorneys and Marshals re-
ceive in the same way ad interim appointments. A controversy
recently arose over the right of Congress to call upon the judges
to enforce the attendance of witnesses before administrative
officers. In the lower courts the existence of this power was
denied." It was sustained, however, in 1894, in the Supreme
Court by a vote of five to three in the case of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission." Notwithstanding that decision, one of the
district judges still maintained that he could not be required to
enforce the attendance of witnesses before special examiners of
the Pension Bureau, but the Supreme Court, on application of
the Commissioner of Pensions, granted a writ of iandamuts com-
pelling him to do so."
IL Territorial Judgs.-The judicial power of the United
States is placed by the Constitittion in the hands of judges who
"shall hold their offices during good behavior." Nevertheless
the people of the Territories and the vast properties there situ-
ated are under the protection of judges who are appointed for
four years only and who are removable by the President. This
10 it re District Attorney. 23 Fed. Rep. 26; United States v. Bashaw. 152
U. S. 436.
" Exparte Riebling, 70 Fed. Rep. 310.
12 In re Pac. R. R. Commission, 32 Fed. Rep. 251; In re McLean, 37 Fed.
Rep. 648; In re Interstate Commerce Commission, 53 Fed. Rep. 4Sx.
"3 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, x5 U. S. 447.
"4 In re. Lochren, 163 U. S. 692.
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practice has existed since the earliest days, and has been re-
peatedly approved by the Supreme Court." These judges have
been termed "legislative courts" as distinguished from "consti-
tutional courts." Their existence is justified under that sweep-
ing constitutional provision which gives to Congress "power to
dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting
the territory or other property belonging to the United States."
For the same reason that these judges are not protected with a
life tenure, they are also not protected from the imposition of
duties non-judicial in nature. They are not judges at all in the
constitutional sense of the term, but are officers to whom are
delegated such judicial powers as must necessarily be performed
by somebody within the Territory.
A similar constitutional provision authorizes Congress "to
exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such
district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may by cession of
particular States and the acceptance of Congress become the
seat of the Government of the United States." It is an unset-
tled question whether it is this provision, or the judiciary article
of the Constitution, which lies at the basis of the -Supreme Court
land the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. That
District, unlike the Territories, is not in a mere period of transi-
tion, expecting soon to become a self-governing State. It has a
large population, and that population ought to receive as com-
plete protection as any other part of the Union. It ought, there-
fore, to be p6ssible for Congress to establish a constitutional
court in the District of Columbia, whose judges, like the judges
of the other inferior Federal courts, can be removed from office
only by the abolition of the court itself. There is much indica-
tion in the laws establishing these courts that Congress actually
intended to accomplish this result.
A peculiar court recently established1' for a temporary period
has also an unsettled status. This is Lhe Court of Private Land
Claims, established for the ascertainment and confirmation, under
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, of Mexican land grants
within the territories of New Mexico, Arizona and Utah, and the
States of Nevada, Colorado and Wyoming. The law establish-
ing the court provided that it should expire December 31, 1895,
and the terms of the judges were to expire with the court. The
court was given a limited term because the work for which it
i McAllister V. United States, 141 U. S. z74, and auth. cit.
16 Act of March 3, 189x, c. 539.
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was established was expected by that time to be completed.
Doubts have been expressed as to the constitutionality of this
legislation, especially with respect to the three States mentioned.
Jurisdiction over the Territories has been sustained under the
territorial clause of the Constitution." The writer is unable
to perceive why it is not sustainable as to the States
also. The court does not exercise that branch of judicial
power which can be granted under the judiciary article
of the Constitution alone. The cases which it adjudicates are
claims against the United States, and are for the legislative
branch of the Government to decide, unless the jurisdiction be
deputed." ' Moreover, the terms of the judges were made to run
until the expiration of the court, and, since Congress can abolish
inferior courts as well as institute them, there seems no reason
why a court should not be instituted for a limited term, to dis-
pose of some temporary class of business.
III. Quasi-Judicial Officers.-Chief-Justice Taney in his last
opinion said: "The Constitution of the United States delegates
no judicial power to Congress. Its powers are confined to legis-
lative duties. "" There is, however, a great deal o power in
Congress which is judicial in its essence; the power, namely,
to hear and decide claims against the United States itself. How-
ever complete may be the analogy between such claims and simi-
lar demands against an individual, they have never been re-
garded as coming within the judiciary article of the Constitution
or the Bill of Rights.20
In early days such claims could only be presented to Con-
gress, and always required special legislation. They are still
adjudicated sometimes by a special act; but more often they are
heard and decided by the forms of judicial procedure. For this
purpose, in 1855 a judicial or quasi.judicial body was established
by Congress under the name of the Court of Claims,"' and its
jurisdiction has since then from time to time been enlarged. Its
judges, according to the terms of the statute, are to hold office
during good behavior, but whether or not these statutory provis-
ions are repealable is an undecided question. The tribunal
might equally well have been styled the Board of Claims, and
1 United States v. Coe, x55 U. S. 76.
18 Astiazaran v. Santa Rita Land and Mining Co., [48 U. S. So, and auth. ciL
"Gordon v. United States, 17 U. S. 697, 705.
"McElrath v. United States, [02 U. S. 426, 44o.
"Act of Feb 24, 1855, ch. [22.
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its members styled commissioners or auditors. In essence its
work is nowise different from that of the accounting officers of
the Treasury. As remarked by Chief-Justice Taney: "Neither
of them possesses judicial power in the sense in which those
words are used in the Constitution. The circumstance that one
is called a court and its decisions called judgments cannot alter
its character nor enlarge its power. "" Yet, as already remarked,
a hearing and decision by such a court is strictly judicial in
nature when Congress does permit the United States to be sued;
and when its decision is unreviewable by the executive it may be
made reviewable by the superior courts. Hence, although the
Chief-Justice rightly said that the Supreme Court's power "is
exclusively judicial, and it cannot be required or authorized to
exercise any other, "' nevertheless that court for thirty years
past has had and constantly exercised power to review decisions
of the Court of Claims when appealed: and by the recent Tucker
Act" the Circuit and District Courts of the United States now
exercise a jurisdiction concurrent with that of the Court of
Claims. As the latter is not a constitutional court, it may be,
and often is, charged with the duty of investigating questions of
fact and law for the benefit of Congress or of executive officers,
who are not bound to act upon its conclusions. Claims against
the United States come commonly first before one of the Audit-
ors of the Treasury; then on appeal before the Comptroller of
the Treasury; then by petition before the Court of Claims or a
Circuit or District Court; and, finally, before the Supreme Court
or the Circuit Court of Appeals. It was recognized by Madison
in the first Congress that such duties, when cast upon the Comp-
troller, are as judicial in nature as those of the courts, and for
this reason he endeavored to obtain legislation giving the Comp-
troller a tenure during good behavior."'
Another quasi-judicial tribunal, passing upon questions as to
which the United States is one of the parties interested, is the
Board of General Appraisers sitting at New York. The decis-
ions of this Board as to the valuation of imported goods are final ;
upon questions of classification they are subject to review by the
courts. Their opinions are printed in the Treasury publication
entitled "Synopsis of Decisions."
22 Gordon v. United States, sufira, at p. 699.
2 Ibid. at p. 700.
U Act of March 3, 1887, c. 359.
2 Annals of Congress, June 29, 1789, pp. 6rx, 614.
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Other claims or quasi-claims against the United States, whose
disposition is under the control of Congress, have been referred
by general laws to executive officers, who decide them by judi-
cial methods. Among the various classes of pecuniary claims
against the Government, by far the largest number are claims
for pensions. These arise from acts of Congress which are
based upon the war power. They are passed upon by the Com-
missioner of Pensions, subject to review by the Secretary of the
Interior. Congress also has the right to dispose of the public
lands of the United States. This power, by general laws, has
been deputed to the officers of the General Land Office, subject
to review by the Secretary of the Interior. Claims to public
lands based upon treaty provisions are sometimes placed by Con-
gress in the hands of tribunals specially constituted, such as the
well-known Board of Land Commissioners in California, and
the Court of Private Land Claims above mentioned. Applica-
tions for letters patent by inventors are passed upon by the Com-
missioner of Patents, whose decisions thereon are not reviewable
by any executive officer. The opinions rendered in pension, land
and patent cases are regularly reported.
These powers have also been exercised directly by Congress
itself through special legislation-including that of granting
patents for inventions." Yet even this power is so judicial in
nature that a direct appeal is allowed from the decisions of the
Commissioner to the courts of the District of Columbia ;" or a bill
in equity may be filed in any United States Court, in case the
applicant is unsuccessful upon appeal, praying an adjudication
that he is entitled to a patent.5" Contrariwise, as has been
already pointed out, rulings of the judges in similar instances
have often been made reviewable by executive officers, and the
constitutionality of such legislation has never yet been over-
thrown by a decision of the Supreme Court.
Decisions of these quasi-judicial officers, when acting within
their jurisdiction, are, as a rule, unreviewable by the courts.
They rank, however, no higher than the decisions of courts of
limited jurisdiction, and when the officer has passed the bounds
of his jurisdiction in rendering a decision, it is void or voidable.-
21 Act of Jan. 21, 1oS, c. 13.
2? Act of Feb. 9, 1893, c. 74, § 9.
28 Rev. St., 1 4915; Gandy v. Marble, 122 U. S. 432.
28 Noble v. Union River Logging R. R., 47 U. S. 16F, 173; Mullan V.
United States, xx8 U. S. 271; Butterworth v. Hoe, 112 U. S. 5o.
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
It is also binding only upon the claimant, the United States, and
parties claiming under them. Thus, a person claiming prior
title is not bound by decisions of the General Land Office, but
may bring suit in equity to compel a conveyance of the land
thus granted."
In some of the bureaus at Washington these decisions are but
nominally made by the officer to whom the case is confided by
Congress. His signature stands for work performed entirely by
the clerical force of his office. This is unavoidable. The work
is so immense that it must be divided up among very many per-
sons. Decisions are thus made by mere clerks which affect vast
property interests and would well deserve the attention of high
judicial tribunals. Systems of appeal within the departments
for the same reason fail to effectuate their purpose. Thus the
Attorney General, joined with the Secretary of the Interior, "act-
ing as a board," was given certain appellate jurisdiction over
the Commissioner of the General Land Office,"' but through
press of other business his personal attention is an absolute
impossibility. A bill was recently introduced in Congress for a
court of departmental appeals, that these cases might be actu-
ally decided by the men whose names are affixed to the decis-
ions, and that these men should be of greater standing in the
community; but it met with no favor.
The system of adjudication by clerks has reached its most
formidable development in the Pension Office. All pension cer-
tificates are supposed to be over the signature of the Commis-
sioner of Pensions, and in theory represent adjudications made
by him as a special quasi-judicial tribunal. As a matter of fact,
the work is done by an immense clerical force. Thus during the
fiscal year ending June 30, 1892, the number of pension applica-
tions passed upon was 459,6xi. This represented about [,5oo for
every working day, and, as the working day in Washington is only
six and one-half hours long, represented one "adjudication" every
fifteen seconds. In fact, the Commissioner did not even sign his
name. It was affixed to the certificate by a rubber stamp.
These clerical "adjudications," made largely upon ex-parte
statements, have recently been much referred to with veneration
such as is given to decrees of a Lord Chancellor. Bills have
been pressed in Congress to render them unreviewable except
upon proof of actual fraud, even this issue to be left to the slow
3 Widdicombe v. Childers, 124 U. S. 400, 405.
s' Rev. St, § 2451.
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processes of an action at law. Claims have been pressed in the
courts that the present legislation has this effect. A test case
was decided adversely to this contention in June, Y895, by the
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.* The decis-
ion came up for review in the Supreme Court of the United
States, where Mr. James C. Carter appeared (as was understood)
on behalf of the great organization known as the Grand Army of
the Republic. Other important questions also were involved in
the case. The Supreme Court ordered a reargument, and
before it was again reached the proceeding abated by the appoint-
ment of the defendant, Commissioner Lochren, to the position
of United States Judge for the District of Minnesota. No pro-
ceeding has been instituted against his successor, and this
interesting question thus remains unsettled.
The limits of this article will not admit of further illustra-
tions, but it is believed that enough has been said to show that
the boundary between the executive and judicial work of the
Government affords interesting ground for exploration.
Edward B. Whitney.
32 Lochren v. Long, 6 App. Cas. D. C. 486.
